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shall be cause for dismissal of such appeal. All errors assigned shall be
passed upon by the court, and in every case where a judgment or order
is reversed and remanded for a new trial or hearing, in its mandate to
the court below, the reviewing court shall state the error or errors
found in the record upon which the judgment of reversal is grounded.
(2) An appeal on questions of law and fact shall entitle the party to
a hearing and determination of the facts de novo and shall be upon
the same or amended pleadings." 12
In summation, the mechanics may be stated briefly as follows:
Within three days after judgment is rendered in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, a motion for new trial is made, and if overruled, an entry
for final order is signed by the presiding judge; the appealing counsel
must then file a Notice of Appeal within twenty (20) days next follow-
ing, to the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken, such
Notice of Appeal containing a designation of the judgment or order
appealed from, and whether the appeal is on questions of law, or law
and fact. Post a supersedeas bond when the appeal is on questions
of law and fact in the amount directed by the court from which the
appeal is taken, such bond to be filed with the clerk of said court.
File a praecipe and pay the required fee to such clerk for the pre-
paring and filing of the transcript of the case with all necessary dockets,
journal entries, papers, etc. Prepare a record of the testimony of the
case with the assistance of a public stenographer if necessary, and list
all errors for review; file Bill of Exceptions submitted with brief with-
in ten days after notice of appeal, and prepare for hearing in the Court
of Appeals.
Samuel L. Devine.
RECENT DECISION
INCOME TAX-CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNrrY OF EMPLOYEE FROM FEDERAL STATE
TAxATIoN.-Respondent, a resident of New York, was employed during 1934 as
an examining attorney for the Home Owners' Loan Corporation at 'an annual
salary of $2400. In his income tax return for that year he included his salary as
subject to the New York state income tax. The law exempted from the tax
"Salaries, wages and other compensation received from the United States of offi-
cials or employees thereof, including persons in the military or naval forces of the
United States." Petitioners, New York State Tax Commissioners, rejected respond-
ent's claim for a refund of the tax based on the ground that his salary was con-
12 Central National Bank of Cleveland v. Newton, (Ohio App. 1939) 22
N. E. (2d) 428; Jarboe v. Workingmen's Overall Supply Co., (Ohio App. 1939)
22 N. E. (2d) 416. See also, Union Trust Co. v. Lessovitz, 122 Ohio St. 406, 171
N. E. 849 (1937).
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stitutionally exempt from state taxation because the Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion is an instrumentality of the United States government and that he, during
the taxable year, was an employee of the Federal government engaged in the per-
formance of a governmental function. On review by certiorari the Tax Board's
action was set aside by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York,
whose order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The United States Supreme
Court in March of 1939 by a momentous and far-reaching decision reversed the
action of the New York courts. Mark Graves et al v. State, of New York ex rel
O'Keefe, 83 L. ed. 577 (1939).
And thus on the 27th day of March, 1939, by one sweeping stroke of judicial
interpretation the United States Supreme Court achieved a goal long sought after
by American economists and socially conscious jurists; a goal only attained by
wholesale overruling of numerous United States decisions bulwarked by the legal
cogency of successive United States Supreme Courts.
In the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Stone, the United States Su-
preme Court expressly overrules by the principal case decisions rendered in Col-
lector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1871); New York ex rel Rogers v.
Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 81 L. ed. 306, 57 S. Ct. 299 (1936); and impliedly over-
rules, so far as they recognize an implied constitutional immunity from income
taxation of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or a state govern-
ment or their instrumentalities Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed.
1022 (1842); Brush v. Commissioners of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352, 81 L.
ed. 691, 57 S. Ct. 495 (1936).
The issue involved in the principal case was whether the imposition by the
State of New York of an income tax on the salary of an employee of the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation placed an unconstitutional burden upon the Federal
government, an issue reaching back into the past to McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 432, 4 L. ed. 579, 607 (1819) and Chief Justice Marshall's hoary
dictum that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." Upon the theory of tax
immunity of either government, state or national, and its instrumentalities, from
taxation by the other laid down in the McCulloch Case has rested the implied
limitation on the taxing power of each not to unduly interfere with the govern-
mental activity of the other through the use and exercise of that power. From
this theory and from this decision has stemmed a formidable flow of authority
in extension of the doctrine; the stream has broadened out so as to confer im-
munity on both state and federal employees from taxation on the salaries they
derive from governmental instrumentalities. The stream swept downhill and for-
ward and suddenly dried up.
As late as 1936 the United States Supreme Court had decided in New York
ex rel Rogers v. Graves (supra) that the salary of the general counsel of the
Panama Rail Road Co., a federal corporate instrumentality, was exempt from the
New York state income tax; the court declaring that since the company was a
federal instrumentality, it necessarily follows that fixed salaries and compensatior
paid to its officers and employees in their capacity as such are just as much im.
mune from state taxation as the instrumentality. Decided during the same year
Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (supra) steadfastly clung to precedent
with the United States Supreme Court holding that the salary of an engineer in
charge of the maintenance of the public water system of New York State was
immune from Federal income taxation because the water system was created and
conducted in the exercise of an essential government function. That precedent
once established is difficult of eradication is furnished by three state cases: Martin
v. Kenesson, 274 Ky. 581, 119 S. W. (2d) 644 (1938) holding no income tax valid
on salary of secretary-treasurer of the Production Credit Corp. of Louisville,. a
corporation created and authorized by Congress; Geery v. Minnesota Tax Comm.,
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202 Minn. 366, 278 N. W. 544 (1938) which held income tax on salary of governor
of Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota invalid; and Gordy v. Crimp, 2 A. (2d)
692 (Md. 1938) which held that the salary of an assistant regional manager of
the Home Owners' Loan Corp. was not subject to state income tax.
Historically, the application of the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland (supra)
received its first manifestation on an income tax on the salary of an employee of
a federal instrumentality in Dobbin v. Erie County (supra) where a tax of Penn-
sylvania, nominally laid upon the office of the captain of a federal cutter, but
roughly measured by the salary paid to the officer, was held invalid on the ground
that the tax on the emolument of office was the equivalent of a tax upon an activ-
ity of the national government and further that it was an infringement of the
implied superior power to fix the compensation of federal employees without
diminution by state taxation. This doctrine was re-affirmed in Collector v. Day
(supra) where the salary of a state probate judge was held constitutionally im-
mune from the Federal income tax on the grounds that the salary of an officer
of a state is exempt from federal taxation, if the function he performs as an offi-
cer is exempt.
In the historical survey of the matter, the writer has gone backward in out-
lining the cases which have been overruled by the principal case; in evaluating
the historical survey of the growth of the stream of discontent with early de-
cisions, the writer will proceed forward in time. Justice Bradley in McCulloch
v. Maryland (supra) did not accept the classical utterance of Chief Justice Marshall
relating to the power of taxation. "I dissent," said he, "from the opinion in this
case, because it seems to me that the general government has the same power of
taxing the income of the officers of the State government as it has of taxing that
of its own officers." But his was a voice walling in the wilderness. A voice lost for
more than a hundred years save in the dissenting opinions in Jaybird Mining Co.
v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609, 615, 70 L. ed. 1112, 1115, 46 S. Ct. 592 (1925); Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 223, 72 L. ed. 857, 859, 48 S. Ct. 451 (1927);
Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 580, 75 L. ed. 1277, 1283,
51 S. Ct. 601 (1928); and Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (supra).
But the first strong indication of a change in the torrent of the stream did not
come until the decision in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 412, 413, 416, 82 L.
ed. 1432, 1433, 1434, 58 S. Ct. 969 (1937). It was pointed out in that case that
the implied immunity of one government and its agencies from taxation by the
other should, as a principle of constitutional construction, be narrowly restricted.
The Court said, "And as applied to the taxation of salaries of the employees of
one government, the purpose of the immunity was not to confer benefits on em-
ployees by relieving them from contributing their share of the financial support
of the other, whose benefits they enjoy, or to give an advantage to that govern-
ment by enabling it to engage employees at a salary lower than those paid for
like services by other employers, public or private, but to prevent undue inter-
ference with the one government by imposing on it the tax burden of the other."
With this it held that the salaries of the employees of the New York Port Author-
ity, a state instrumentality, created by New York and New Jersey, were not im-
mune from federal income tax. This case, it is submitted, conclusively established
the right of the federal government to tax salaries of state employees, a right
previously extended in government contractor cases. A claim of an exemption
from tax on the income of a contractor engaged in carrying out a government
project was rejected in case of a contractor with a state in Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 70 L. ed. 384, 46 S. Ct. 172 (1925), and of a contractor
with the national government in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134,
82 L. ed. 155, 58 S. Ct. 208 (1937). The stream was about to dry up.
In the principal case, the Court held that the imposition by a state of a non-
discriminatory income tax in respect of the salary of an employee of a corporate
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instrumentality of the Federal government did not place an unconstitutional
burden on the Federal government where Congress has not conferred on the
salaries of the employees of such instrumentality an immunity from state taxation.
It was said that the only possible basis for implying a constitutional immunity
from state income tax of -the salary of an employee of the national government
or of a governmental agency is that the economic burdens of the tax is in some
way passed on so as to impose a burden on the national government tantamount
to an intereference by one government with the other in the performance of its
function. In this regard, it is well to remember that the possibility that a non-
discriminatory tax upon the income of a state officer did not involve any sub-
stantial interference with the functioning of the state government was not dis-
cussed in the early cases holding contra.
Congress declared in the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 that the Home
Owners' Loan Corp. was a corporate instrumentality of the government. Further-
more, Congress exempted from state taxation bonds of the corporation, as to prin-
cipal and interest, except surtaxes, estate, inheritance and gift taxes; the corpora-
tion itself, including its franchise, its capital, reserves and surplus, and its loans
and income; but it did not exempt its real property, nor did it expressly exempt
salaries of its employees. On this point the Court said an intention on the part of
Congress to confer on employees of a corporate instrumentality of government
created by it immunity from state taxation of their salaries is not to be gathered
by implication from the silence of the statute creating the instrumentality. Strik-
ing back at the decision in the McCullock Case, the court further said that the
theory that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source is no
longer tenable. Upon this point the stream would either dry out or sweep forward
as a greater torrent than before; but here it stopped. It will be remembered that
the power to create the agency includes the implied power to do whatever is
needful or.appropriate, and, if not expressly prohibited, there has been attributed
to Congress some scope for granting or withholding immunity of federal agencies
from state taxation. Helvering v. Gerhardt (supra); United States v. Bekins, 304
U. S. 27, 52, 82 L. ed. 1137, 1144, 58 S. Ct. 811 (1937); British-American Oil Pro-
duing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 81 L. ed. 95, 57 S. Ct. 132
(1936). The silence of Congress implies immunity no more than does the silence
of the Constitution. Then, if Congress had desired to grant immunity, it would
have done so.
The Court held the present tax to be a non-discriminatory tax on income ap-
plied to salaries at a specified rate, and not in form or substance a tax upon the
corporation; furthermore, the tax is not paid by the United States government
or by the corporation, but is measured by the income which becomes the prop-
erty of the taxpayer when received as compensation for his services and is paid
from private funds. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 313, 314, 81
L. ed. 666, 670, 671, 57 S. Ct. 466 (1936); Helvering v. Gerhardt (supra); Fox
Film Co. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 76 L. ed. 1010, 52 S. Ct. 546 (1931); Helvering
v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 82 L. ed. 907, 58 S. Ct. 623 (1931).
Consequently, the court reached the decision that although assuming that the
Home Owners' Loan Corp. is clothed with the same immunity from a state taxation
as the government itself, it could not say that the present tax on the income of its
employees lays an unconstitutional burden upon it.
The stream has ceased to flow. Only Justice Butler dissents and he hurls inm-
self back more than a hundred years to the McCulloch Case and Chief Justice
Marshall's "the power to tax is the power to destroy." Said Mr. Justice Butler,
"Futile indeed are the vague intimations that this court may protect against exces-
sive or destructive taxation. Where the power to tax exists, legislatures may exert it
to destroy, to discourage, to protect or exclusively for the purpose of raising
revenue." And herein is found perhaps the lone criticism of the principal case.
